Surge in violence reveals limits of U.S.-Iraqi security partnership

BAGHDAD, Iraq - (KRT) - Officials of the U.S.-led occupation in Iraq talk of a growing partnership with the new Iraqi security services. But the clashes of the last week in Baghdad, Fallujah and at least 10 other Iraqi cities have exposed the practical and philosophical limits of that partnership.

Police abandoned their posts when threatened by the militia of Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr. A battalion from the new Iraqi army refused to deploy in support of U.S. Marines in Fallujah. Some police officers were even accused of turning on U.S. troops and joining their attackers.

Rejecting allegations of cowardice, police interviewed over the weekend said their comrades would have been foolish to engage militia forces that had them outgunned and overmatched. But more troubling, many Iraqi police and some soldiers say they no longer believe in the tactics or the mission of the U.S.-led forces.

"We are military, and so we have to follow the orders of our commanders," said a police lieutenant at the Al-Karadah station in Baghdad. "But I tell you this: We are with the people. We are not with the Americans."

Should this split widen, the consequences would be severe. The whole U.S. security strategy in Iraq is built around transferring more responsibility to Iraqi forces over the coming months.

If the so-called "lead from the rear" strategy failed, U.S. troops would have to come back out from their back bases and reassert themselves aggressively in Iraqi daily life. That might keep a lid on violence, but it would also fan the growing hostility toward the occupation. And the Pentagon would have to send more troops to Iraq, officials say.

For now such talk is premature, Pentagon officials insist. They dismiss the Iraqi failures as isolated cases or just growing pains. They note the great bravery many Iraqi police and soldiers have displayed and the profound sacrifices many have made.

"Over all the Iraqi security services have performed well under very difficult circumstances," said Dan Senor, chief spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority. "That said there have been exceptions. ... For some of them the quality of their skills should be improved."

Senor said the cases of poor performance and wrongdoing would be investigated.

That could keep people busy. In the Baghdad slum of Sadr City, home to many members of Sadr's militia, police heard threats of attacks on their stations and retreated into the main station in the area. In the south, Iraqi police, including some who had received coalition-sponsored training in Jordan, provided little defense against the takeover of buildings by Sadr's men. Some even joined the Shiite gunmen.

"The coalition is disappointed; everyone is disappointed," said Ahmed Chalabi, a member to the Iraqi Governing Council, in an interview posted on the Council on Foreign Relations Web site. "It was not a surprise that the police would behave in this way. ... We must make a re-evaluation of the way the police have been recruited, how they've been trained and their morale.

"This has been a serious wake-up call in preparation for the hand-over of sovereignty on June 30," Chalabi said.

Some Baghdad police officers say they are ill equipped to deal with large groups of well-armed men. The process of hiring, training and particularly equipping the police and armed forces is far behind the goals set a year ago. Iraq's new police and soldiers, in Baghdad as elsewhere, do not have the communications equipment, body armor, vehicles or weapons to do their jobs.

The officers of Al-Karadah tell of sharing pistols and body armor. There are too few badges to go around, so they say they share those too. They even share a communal cup, a cut-off Pepsi can, at the water cooler in the boss' office.

"We are a target now more than ever," said Ahmed Al-Abaidi, 30, who said he has been a police officer for a decade. "This is fight between the Americans and Sadr's people, but I think they feel like they can't attack the Americans with all their weapons. So we become the target."

"Our job is different from the Americans'," said Hamed Al-Lami, 27, who started in police work four years ago. "We don't deal with politics. We don't deal with religion. We want to concentrate on our job and serve the people."

Their boss was more critical of the occupation. While saying he did not want to see American blood spilled - "American soldiers have families too" - the police lieutenant said Iraq could not have peace or stability until the Americans withdrew from the cities and stayed in their bases.

"We want democracy and freedom," said the officer, who did not want his name used. "We got rid of the time of the mass graves. The Americans gave us this. But now they give us Fallujah? They give us 500 people killed in Fallujah?"

None of the officers interviewed at Al-Karadah blamed colleagues for "withdrawing," as they put it. But they acknowledged feeling ashamed seeing video on television of Sadr's men driving around in police jeeps and occupying police buildings.

"It makes us sad and upset," Al-Abaidi said. "When someone else is driving your car, you lose respect. People look at you funny, like, `What happened?' `Why didn't you fight?'"

As widespread as the police failures were, the bigger issue for the immediate future of U.S. troops might be the performance of the Iraqi armed forces.

Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of coalition forces in Iraq, acknowledged Sunday that a battalion of the new Iraq army refused to go to Fallujah to join Marines fighting in the Sunni opposition stronghold.

Speaking on NBC's "Meet The Press," Sanchez said the incident "did in fact uncover some significant challenges in some of the Iraqi security force structures."

According to the Washington Post, which first reported the incident Sunday, the 620-man 2nd Battalion of the Iraqi Armed Forces refused to fight Monday after members of the unit were shot at in Sadr City. It was the first time U.S. commanders had sought to involve the postwar Iraqi army in major combat.

U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton told the Post that battalion members insisted, "We did not sign up to fight Iraqis."

"We knew that there were some risks that we were taking by standing up security forces quickly," Sanchez said Sunday, "and we also know that it's going to take us a while to stand up reliable forces that can accept responsibility for both the internal and the external security of the country."

A senior Army officer told the Post that at least 20 percent of Iraqi security forces had failed to perform their duties in recent days.

That is not an option for Al-Abaidi, who said the only thing his group has done differently is teaming up patrols to keep officers from getting isolated.

"How am I going to leave my job?" he asked. "I have nothing to do with either side. But I have to defend my country."

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(Chicago Tribune correspondent Vincent J. Schodolski contributed to this report.)

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© 2004, Chicago Tribune.

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